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NOTES
JUSTIFIABLE USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY THE POLICE:
A STATUTORY SURVEY
In recent years much concern has arisen regarding the use of physical
force by police authorities.1 It is the purpose of this survey to examine
the outer limit of such force, namely the justifiable use of deadly force.
At the outset much confusion can be avoided by defining the scope
of this study. The focus is upon the statutory response of the states"
to this area of the criminal law known as "justification." 4 No attempt
1. See, e.g., Aspen, Arrest And Arrest Alternatives: Recent Trends, 1966 U. ILL. L.
FoRUM 241 (1966); Avins, Equal Protection Against Unnecessary Police Violence and
the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Conment, 19 Btn'. L.
REv. 599 (1970); Locke, Police Brutality and Civilian Review Boards: A Second Look,
44 J. URBAN L. 625 (1967); Robin, Justifiable Homicide by Police Officers, 54 J. CrIM.
L. C. of P. S. 225 (1963); Tsimbinos, Justified Use of Deadly Force, 4 CRIM. L. Bm. 3
(1968); Note, Justification for the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 STAN. L. REv.
566 :(1961). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07, Comment 1, n.1 at 53 (Tent. Draft
No. 8, 1958) [hereinafter cited as MPC Tent. Draft].
2. Compare these three statutory approaches to the definition of "deadly force":
*.. "deadly force" means force which the actor uses with the purpose of
causing or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or
serious bodily harm. Purposely firing a firearm in the direction of another
person or at a vehicle in which another person is believed to be constitutes
deadly force. A threat to cause death or serious bodily harm, by the pro-
duction of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor's purpose is limited
to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does
not constitute deadly force ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (1962).
Force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm . . . includes:
(1) The firing of a firearm in the direction of the person to be arrested,
even though no intent exists to kill or inflict great bodily harm; and
(2) The firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which the person to be arrested
is riding.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-8 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
"Deadly physical force" means physical force which, under the circum-
stances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or other
serious physical injury.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(11) (McKinney 1967).
3. More than one half of the states have statutes dealing with the justifiable use of
deadly force. Note 28 infra.
4. A distinction between justifiable and excusable homicide must be made, for it is
only the former with which we are concerned. Justifiable homicide is authorized or
commanded by law. Homicide which is not justifiable, but committed under circum-
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is made to deal with the rights of private individuals, i.e. the civil liability
of the police,5 or the police officer's right of self defense.6 Rather, the
aim here is to examine the statutorily sanctioned use of deadly force
primarily in the areas of effecting an arrest and preventing an escape. 7
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The common law approach to the authorization of the use of deadly
force by a police officer was based upon the simplistic distinction be-
tween a felony and a misdemeanor.8 As a general rule, deadly force
was justified when necessarily 9 used to combat a felon, but not a mis-
demeanant.10 The rationale of the common law rule rested upon the
fact that all felonies were punishable by death."
stances not involving criminal guilt is deemed excusable. R. PERKINS, CIum AL LAW 33
(2d ed. 1969). See also J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW S 83 (1934).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 131 (1965); Foote, Tort Remedies for
Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d
873 (1958).
6. See, e.g., Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201, 283-85 (1940). See
generally J. Mitu2, supra note 4, § 84(e); R. PERINS, supra note 4, at 997-1009; 1
0. WAPREN, HOMICmE § 148 (1938).
7. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.07(1), (2), (3) (1962).
8. The term felony long ago lost its original and characteristic meaning.
In the early common law it denoted those offenses which were punishable
by forfeiture of lands and goods. This was the only test. The criterion of
felony was not the character or degree of the unlawful act, but rather
the penal consequence of forfeiture. At a later period those crimes which
worked a forfeiture were spoken of as felonies, and eventually the actual
crime committed was designated by the word felony. These crimes were
of such a nature that capital punishment was often superadded, according
to the degree of guilt, and in time felony erroneously came to include all
crimes punishable by death.
Note, Legalized Murder of a Fleeing Felon, 15 VA. L. REv. 582, 583 (1929) (footnotes
omitted).
The common law divided crimes into three classes, namely treason, felony, and
misdemeanor. The felonies were: felonious homicide (murder or manslaughter), arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, prison breach and rescue of a felon. Misdemeanors
comprised those crimes other than treason or felonies. R. PERKINS, supra note 4, at
9-11.
9. The concept of "necessary" will be developed at note 20, infra and accompanying
text.
10. See J. MILLER, supra note 4, §§ 63, 64; R. PERmiNS, supra note 4, at 980-81;
0. WARREN, supra note 6, §§ 145-47; Comment, The Use of Deadly Force in the
Arrest of Misdemeanants, 5 Mo. L. REV. 93 (1940); Note, Legalized Murder of a
Fleeing Felon, supra note 8; Note, The Application of Deadly Force to Effectuate an
Arrest, 5 WAsHBuN L. J. 262 (1966).
11. Refer to the discussion of felonies at common law, supra note 8.
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It was considered dangerous to allow a felon to be at large; and
in committing a felony, the actor forfeited his right to life. The
extirpation was but a premature execution of the inevitable judg-
ment.1
2
Although the protections and formalities of an orderly trial and con-
viction were dispensed with, the killing of a felon resulted in no greater
consequences than those authorized for the punishment of the offense."3
The "felony-misdemeanor" rule was invoked in varying situations:
the effectuation of an arrest, 4 the prevention of an escape' 5 or the com-
mission of a crime,' 6 and the suppression of a riot.'7 Some courts modi-
fied the general rule that a felony authorized the necessary use of deadly
force in the prevention of the commission of a crime.' 8 A distinction
was made between a dangerous or violent felony and one that was not
dangerous; the latter was considered akin to a misdemeanor in that it did
not justify homicide by the person attempting to prevent the crime.' 9
The main limitation upon the use of deadly force was the require-
ment that it be a "last resort" alternative by the police officer in ac-
complishing his lawful purpose. That is, its use had to be deemed
12. Note, Legalized Murder of a Fleeing Felon, supra note 8 at 583 (footnotes
omitted).
13. MPC Tent. Draft, Comment 3, at 56. In the case of a misdemeanor, the punish-
ment was quite different. The rationale was, therefore, that "[iFn such cases it is better,
and more in consonance with modern notions regarding the sanctity of human life,
that the offender escape than that his life be taken, in a case where the extreme
penalty would be a trifling fine or a few days' imprisonment in jail." State v. Smith,
127 Iowa 534, 537, 103 N.W. 944, 945 (1905).
14. f'. MimRa, supra note 4, § 64(b); R. PERKINs, supra note 4, at 980-81; 0. WARREN,
supra note 6, § 145; Perkins, The Law of Arrest, supra note 6 at 268-80; Waite, Some
Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest, 29 MicI. L. REv. 448 (1931); Note, Officer's Right
to Use Deadly Force to Arrest Fleeing Arrestee, 24 IowA L. REv. 154 (1938); Comment,
supra note 10; Note, The Application of Deadly Force to Effectuate an Arrest, supra
note 10.
15. J. MiLLER, supra note 4, § 64(c); R. PERK NS, supra note 4, at 980-81; 0. WAR-
aRm, supra note 6, § 145; Perkins, The Law of Arrest, supra note 6 at 285-89.
16. J. MiLrE, supra note 4, § 64(f); R. PERKINS, supra note 4, at 990-91; 0. WARREN,
supra note 6, § 147.
17. See J. MITIER, supra note 4, § 64(d); 0. WARN, supra note 6, § 147; MPC
Tent. Draft, Comment 5, at 68. See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 4, at 405-08.
18. Note 16, supra.
19. E.g., Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 339 (1882). See also R. PE INs, supra note 4, at
983-84, 990-92; Note, Criminal Law-Use of Deadly Force in Preventing Escape of
Fleeing Minor Felon, 34 N.C.L. Rrv. 122 (1955).
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"necessary," '0 no other reasonable means being available to carry out his
legal duty.
Problem areas in the simplistic common law approach to justification
developed. For example, what was the criminal liability of a police
officer who necessarily killed a fleeing suspect, believed to be a felon,
but who was in fact a misdemeanant? Most courts, in applying the
common law rule, held that if the police officer had reasonable grounds
to believe that the criminal was a felon, the homicide was justifiable.
21
Consequently, no criminal liability resulted. Other courts, however,
took the position that a felon in fact was required by the law for
homicide to be deemed justifiable.22 Illustrative of this view, a Kentucky
court reasoned that:
, . . The common-law rule allowing an officer to kill a felon in
order to arrest him rests upon the idea that felons ought not to be
at large, and that the life of a felon has been forfeited; for felonies
at common law were punishable with death. But where no felony
has been committed the reason for the rule does not apply, and
it seems to us that the sacredness of human life and the danger of
abuse do not permit an extension of the common-law rule to cases
of suspected felonies. 23
In effect, a strict or absolute liability was imposed on the police officer,
notwithstanding that he may have acted reasonably and in good faith.
Today, not only does the distinction between a felony and a misde-
meanor have a different meaning and consequence than it had at com-
mon law, but, as will be demonstrated later, many modern state statutes
have not clarified whether a felony in fact is required.24 Few felonies
20. The term "necessary" denotes an objective standard. For example, the cases
speak of "the measure of necessary force [as] that which an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, with the knowledge and in the same situation of the arresting officer,
would have deemed necessary." Barrett v. United States, 64 F.2d 148, 149 (App. D.C.
1933), citing Castle v. Lewis, 254 F. 917, 925 (8th Cir. 1918). For a more detailed
discussion of the language used by the courts in describing "necessary", see Note,
Officer's Right to Use Deadly Force to Arrest Fleeing Arrestee, supra note 14, at
159-61.
21. R. PERKINS, supra note 4, at 981-83; Note, Officer's Right to Use Deadly Force to
Arrest Fleeing Arrestee, supra note 14, at 156-61; Note, The Application of Deadly
Force to Effectuate an Arrest, supra note 10, at 264-65 (1966).
22. Id. See also the discussion in MPC Tent. Draft, Comment 3, at 57.
23. Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 105, 70 S.W. 297, 299 (1902). See also Com-
monwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946).
24. See notes 33 to 42 infra and accompanying text.
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are now punishable by death, many "new" felonies have been created by
statute,25 and some misdemeanors are certainly of a more dangerous
nature than some particular felonies.26 The perpetuation of the com-
mon law "felony-misdemeanor" rule has, therefore, been aptly described
as an anachronism in the modem criminal law.27 What has been the re-
sponse of state legislatures to the anachronistic common law "felony-
misdemeanor" rule of justifiable homicide with regard to the police?
THE STATUTORY RESPONSE
More than one half of the states have enacted statutes dealing with
the justifiable use of deadly force,28 most of them containing an express
25. See MPC Tent. Draft, Comment 3, at 56-57; Note, Officer's Right to Use Deadly
Force to Arrest Fleeing Arrestee, supra note 14, at 156.
26. Today, the significance of the distinction between felony and mis-
demeanor has wholly altered. Relatively few crimes are punishable by
death. A very small percentage of arrests actually made are for offenses
which are capitally punishable. . . . Moreover, under modern legislation,
many statutory misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous to life and
limb than some felonies. Compare, for example, such felonies as the
distillation of alcohol in violation of the revenue laws, on the one hand,
and such misdemeanors as reckless and drunken driving, on the other.
Even a felony which often is committed in such a way as to endanger life,
may in many particular cases be committed in a fashion which creates no
such peril. Accordingly the felony-misdemeanor distinction is inherently
incapable of separating out those persons of such dangerousness that the
perils arising from failure to accomplish immediate apprehension justify
resort to extreme force to accomplish it... As a result of these difficulties
and the awareness that the reckless use of firearms by peace officers can
create a social problem of no mean proportions, a number of attempts have
been made to alter and rationalize the existing rules relating to the use of
deadly force in arrest situations....
MPC Tent. Draft, Comment 3, at 56-58.
27. Note, Justification for the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, supra note 1, at
583.
28. ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.090 (1962); Aaiz. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 13-461 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2237 to 39 (Repl. Vol. 1964); CAL. PErNA CODE § 196 (West
1969); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-16 (1963); CONN. PENAL CODE § 24 (effective
1971); FLA. STAT. § 782.02 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-902 (1969); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-4011 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 7-5, 7-9 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-1007 (Repl. Vol., Burns 1956); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:20 (1950); MiNN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 609.06, 609.065 (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2218 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 559.040 (1949); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 94-2512 (Repl. Vol. 1969); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 200.140 (1963); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:113-5 (1969); N.M. STAT. AN. § 40A-2-7 (1953);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-04 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 732 (1958); ORE. REv. STAT. § 163.100(1) (1968); S.D. CODE
§ 22-16-32 (1967); Tax. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1210, 1212 (1961); UTAH CODE ANN.
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provision relating to the police officer.29 Others are cast in terms of
"Cany person" 30 and thereby, impliedly at least, include police officers.
These statutes have been categorized herein and are accompanied by a
brief analysis.
Codification of the Common Law
The majority of the states which have enacted justifiable homicide
statutes3l have essentially codified the common law "felony-misde-
meanor" rule.3z Mississippi is illustrative of this type of statutory ap-
proach.
The killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or omis-
sion of another shall be justifiable in the following cases:
(a) When committed by public officers, or those acting by
their command in their aid and assistance, in obedience to any
judgment of a competent court;
(b) When necessarily committed by public officers, or those
acting by their command in their aid and assistance, in overcom-
ing actual resistance to the execution of some legal process, or to
the discharge of any other legal duty;
(c) When necessarily committed by public officers, or those
acting by their command in their aid and assistance, in retaking
any felon who has been rescued or has escaped;
(d) When necessarily committed by public officers, or those
acting by their command in their aid and assistance, in arresting
any felon fleeing from justice;
§ 76-30-9 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2305 (Revision 1959); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9.48.160 (1961); Wis. STAT. §§ 939.45, 939.48 (1958).
29. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 11.15.090 (1962); CAL. PENAL CODE § 196 (West 1969); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-4011 (1948); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-7 (1953).
30. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-902 (Revision 1969); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:20 (1950);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.040 (1949).
31. Note 28, supra.
32. See Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-461 (1956); ARu. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2237 to 2239
(Repl. Vol. 1964); CAL. PENAL CODE § 196 (West 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-16
(1963); CONN. PENAL CODE § 24 (effective 1971); FLA. STAT. § 782.02 (1965); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-4011 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.065(3) (1964); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 2218 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-2512 (Repl. Vol. 1969); NEV. REv. STAT.
§200.140 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-7 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-04 (1960);
OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 732 (1958); S.D. CODE § 22-16-32 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-30-9 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.48.160 (1961).
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(h) When necessarily committed in lawfully suppressing any
riot or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace. 33
It is evident from this statute that the requisites for the sanctioned use
of deadly force by a police officer in the effectuation of an arrest or
the prevention of an escape are identical. The homicide must have been
"necessarily committed," and the arrestee or escapee must have been a
felon. A basic weakness of this simplistic approach is that it is not clear
from the statute whether or not a felon in fact is required in order to
justify the homicide.3 4 A literal reading of the statute indicates the
requirement of an actual felon. Consequently, if the arrestee or escapee
is not in fact a felon, a homicide is not justifiable, and a police officer
who killed such a person would be criminally responsible. Although
most courts at common law had held that the felony requisite was satis-
fied if the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the
arrestee or escapee was a felon, 5 it is disturbing that in the drafting of
a statute the ambiguity surrounding the felony in fact problem was not
avoided by the use of more lucid terminology.
Seven states within the "codification of the common law" classifica-
tion have attempted to remedy this problem by utilization of the lan-
guage "a person charged with a felony" in lieu of merely "a felon." "
Of these seven states, five have chosen to apply this language in the case
of an arrest but not in the prevention of an escape.37 For example:
Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers and
those acting by their command in their aid and assistance either:
1. In obedience to any judgment of a competent court, or
2. Necessarily committed:
(a) In overcoming actual resistance to the execution of some
legal process, or in the discharge of any other legal duty.
(b) In retaking felons who have been rescued or who have
escaped.
33. MIss. CODE ANN. § 2218 (1942).
34. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
35. Id.
36. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2238 (RepI. Vol. 1964); AM. RM. STAT. ANN. § 13-461(c)
(1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 196(3) (West 1969); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-16
(1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4011(3) (1948); Mour. Rv. CODES ANN. § 94-2512(3)
(Repl. Vol. 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-30-9(3) (1953).
37. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-461(c) (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 196(3) (West
1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4011(3) (1948); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 94-2512(3)
(Repl. Vol. 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. 76-30-9(3) (1953).
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(c) In arresting persons charged 'with felony who are fleeing
from justice or resisting arrest.38
There appears to be no valid basis for the distinction between an arrest
and an escape in this type of statute. Literally construed, the above
statute requires a felon in fact in the case of an escape, while requiring
only "a person charged with a felony" in an arrest situation. By com-
parison, the remaining two states adopting the "charged with a felony"
language have used the same or similar qualifying language in both the
arrest and escape situations. 39 In these two states then, it is clear that a
felony in fact is not necessary in either an arrest or an escape. Addi-
tionally, statutes of two other states within the common law classifica-
tion appear to indicate that a felony in fact is required in an arrest,
but not in an escape. 40 This approach places the "in fact" emphasis pre-
cisely opposite the previously mentioned five states which appear to re-
quire a felony in fact for an escape but not for an arrest.41 It is diffi-
cult, therefore, to rationalize the legislative intent which resulted in such
arbitrary and inconsistent modifications of the common law rule.
If one assumes that the objective of a statute is to provide that a felony
in fact is not required in either an arrest or an escape, such a statute can
readily be drafted. The phrase "charged with a felony" in only one of
the arrest or escape situations leads to confusion which might best be
avoided by an approach akin to the recent Connecticut formulation:
(a) For purposes of this section, a reasonable belief that a person
has committed an offense means a reasonable belief in facts or
circumstances which if true would in law constitute an offense. If
the believed facts or circumstances would not in law constitute an
offense, an erroneous though not unreasonable belief that the law
38. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-461 (1956) (emphasis added).
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2238, 2239 (Repl. Vol. 1964); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
5 40-2-16 (1963). These statutes are essentially identical, and each provides that a
police officer may be justified in killing an arrestee who is "charged with a felony" or
an escapee who is "accused of any felony."
40. Homicide is justifiable when committeed by a public officer, or person
acting under his command and in his aid, in the following cases:
3. When necessary in retaking an escaped or rescued prisoner who has
been committed, arrested for, or convicted of a felony; or in arresting
a person who has committed a felony and is fleeing from justice . ...
NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.140(3) (1963). See also WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.48.160(3)
(1961).
41. Notes 37, 38 supra and accompanying text.
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is otherwise does not render justifiable the use of physical force to
make an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody.
(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force upon
another person for a purpose specified in ... [this section] only
when he reasonably believes that such is necessary to:
(2) effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of
a person whom he reasonably believes has committed or attempted
to commit a felony.42
This statute is a great improvement over the other statutory formula-
tions discussed, for the use of the language "a person whom he [the
policeman] reasonably believes has committed or attempted to commit
a felony" clearly and simply solves the felony in fact problem.
Before leaving the discussion of the "codification of the common law"
statutes, a brief mention of the use of deadly force by the police in a
riot situation is in order.43 As seen in section "h" of the Mississippi
statute reproduced above," all that is required to justify a homicide
is that it be "necessarily committed in lawfully suppressing any riot
.... " This is a common provision 5 among the more than thirty states
which have adopted such Statutes expressly dealing with the suppres-
sion of riots by the police. 0  It is interesting to note, parenthetically,
that a riot is generally a statutory misdemeanor, 47 and this permitted use
of deadly force to combat a misdemeanor constitutes an exceptional
situation. The English common law provided for justifiable homicide
in the suppression of a riot,4 8 but the adoption of the English "Riot
42. CONN. PENAL CODE § 23 (a), (c) (effective 1971) (emphasis added). For a general
,discussion of the newly enacted penal code, see Comment, The Structure of Connecti-
,cut's New Penal Code, 2 CoNN. L. Rxv. 661 (1970).
43. The use of deadly force by the police in a riot situation has been recently
discussed in depth elsewhere. E.g., McGee, Arrests In Civil Disturbances: Reflections
On the Use of Deadly Force In Riots, 22 Rtrro. L. Rxv. 716 (1968); Comment, Kill
,or Be Killed?: Use of Deadly Force In the Riot Situation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 829 (1968).
44. Note 33 supra and accompanying text.
45. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 11.15.100 (1962); CAr.. PENAL CoD § 197(4) (West 1969);
FLA. STAT. §§ 782.02(3), 870.05 (1965); MicH. Comvp. LAws ANN. § 750.527 (1968);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.040(3) (1949); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:126-6 (1969); Tx. PEN.
CODE art. 1219 (1961); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 904, 2305(3) (Revision 1959).
46. MPC Tent. Draft, Comment 5, at 68.
47. E.g., CONN. PENAL CODE §§ 185 to 188 (effective 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2601
(1969); NEa. REv. STAT. §§ 28-804, 29-102 (Reissue 1964); S.D. CODE § 22-10-7 (1967).
See also Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1135 (1927).
48. See note 17, supra.
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Act" in 1714 made a riot a felonious offense.49 Finally, it must be noted
that the police officer's right of self-defense might often be invoked
in a riot situation.50
"Crime-Escape" Statutes
Alaska and Oregon have drastically altered the common law "felony-
misdemeanor" rule with regard to an escape. For example, the Alaska
statute provides that:
The killing of a human being is justifiable when committed by a
public officer or a person acting in the aid and assistance and by
the command of a public officer
(3) when necessarily committed in retaking persons charged
with or convicted of crime who have escaped or been rescued; or
(4) when necessarily committed in arresting a person fleeing
from justice who has committed a felony."'
The phrase "a person ...who has committed a felony" implies that
a felon in fact is necessary to justify the homicide of an arrestee. In
the prevention of an escape, however, the statute provides only that the
escapee be charged with a crime. Thus, a crime, impliedly not a crime
in fact, rather than a felony is required. An escapee who is merely
charged with a misdemeanor can apparently be justifiably killed by a
police officer in order to prevent an escape. This approach is indeed
much harsher upon the escapee than the common law "felony-misde-
meanor" rule.
The Texas "Self-Defense" Statute
Texas has perhaps the most unique provision applicable to police offi-
cers within its justifiable homicide statute.
Art. 1210. Homicide by an officer in the execution of lawful
orders of magistrates and courts is justifiable when he is violently
resisted and has just grounds to fear danger to his own life in
executing the order.
49. 1 Geo. I, stat. 2, c. 5 (1714); See R. PERKINS, supra note 4, at 407.
50. See the discussion in MPC Tent. Draft, Comment 5, at 68.
51. ALAsKA STAT. § 11.15.090 (3), (4) (1962). See also ORE. Rnv. STAT. 56
163.100(1) (b), (c) (1968).
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_Art. 1212.
8. The officer or other person executing an order of arrest is
required to use such force as may be necessary to prevent an es-
cape when it is attempted, but he shall not in any case kill one
who attempts to escape, unless in making or attempting such
escape the life of the officer is endangered, or he is threatened
with great bodily injury.
9. In overcoming a resistance to the execution of an order, the
officer or person executing the same may oppose such force as is
necessary to overcome the resistance, but he shall not take the life
of the person resisting unless he has just ground to fear that his
own life will be taken or that he will suffer great bodily injury
in the execution of the order.
10. A prisoner under sentence of death or of imprisonment in
the penitentiary or attempting to escape from the penitentiary
may be killed by the person having legal custody of him, if his
escape can in no other manner be prevented.52
A policeman is apparently not privileged to resort to the use of deadly
force against an arrestee or escapee (except one attempting to escape
from a penitentiary) unless the officer's own life is endangered, or he
is threatened with great bodily injury. In essence, this is tantamount
to a requirement of self-defense.', The focus of the statute is upon the
dangerousness of the arrestee vis-a-vis the police officer, and not on
the statutory classification of the criminal's act as a felony or misde-
meanor. Only in the case of a prisoner under sentence of death, or
of a penitentiary escapee, may the officer resort to deadly force when
his own life is not endangered. Although this is an exception to the
"self-defense" provisions of the statute, it is justified by the rationale that
an escapee under such conditions would normally be inclined toward a
dangerous nature."'
"Dangerous Felony" Statutes
As a result of the harshness of the application of the common law
"felony-misdemeanor" rule today,55 a number of states have enacted
52. TFX. PEN. CoDE ANx. arts. 1210, 1212(8), (9), (10) (1961).
53. See, e.g., Grohoske v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 338, 61 S.W.2d 847 (1933).
54. Illinois, as well as the Model Penal Code, has similarly distinguished between
an escape from custody and an escape from a detention facility. For a discussion
of the rationale underlying this type of distinction, see note 65 infra and accom-
panying text.
55. Note 26 supra.
'1970]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
justifiable homicide statutes which depart from the common law by
requiring that the felony in question be of a "dangerous" nature. 6
The commission of "any" felony is not enough to justify a homicide as
was true at common law; it must be a "forcible felony" involving
danger to life or great bodily harm:
A homicide is justifiable:
(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably
believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving
great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself
from that danger; or
(2) When committed, for the purpose of preventing a violent
or forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm,
by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is about to be
committed and that such action is necessary for its prevention.
The circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fear of a reason-
able person that there would be serious danger to his own life or
person if he attempted to prevent the felony without the killing.57
Since it is not permissible to use deadly force to prevent the commission
of "any" felony under the statute, a fortiori it is not permissible for a
policeman to use deadly force to effect an arrest or prevent an escape of
one who has committed such a felony.58 For example, following a theft
of an automobile and a high speed chase by the police, a thief attempting
to flee on foot was shot and killed by a policeman attempting to prevent
his escape. It was held, under the Louisiana statute reproduced above,
that this was not a justifiable homicide.59 The court reasoned that once
56. See GA. Col)EANN. S 26-902 (Revision 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 7-5, 7-9
(Smith-Hurd 1964); LA. RFv. STAT. ANN. S 14:20 (1950); N.Y. PENAL LAW 9 35.30
(McKinney Supp. 1970).
57. LA. REv. STAT. Am. § 14:20 (1950). The recently adopted Georgia statute is
very similar:
(a) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such threat or
force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a person is justified in using
force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only
if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or
great bodily injury to himself or a third person, or the commission of a
forcible felony....
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-902 (1969).
58. See Sauls v. Hutto, 304 F. Supp. 124, 130 (E.D. La. 1969).
59. Id. at 129-32.
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the high speed chase was ended and the thief had abandoned the stolen
automobile, the theft was complete and the felony no longer involved
any danger to others, as it had while the chase was in progress. Had the
felon been killed during the chase the homicide would have been justi-
fiable; but once the chase had ended, the homicide was not committed
in self-defense or for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible
felony.60
Illinois has also adopted a statute which departs from the common
law approach:
(a) A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned
or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from
efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened
resistance to the arrest. He is justified in the use of any force
which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest
and of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to
defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the
arrest. However, he is justified in using force likely to cause
death or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to
himself or such other person, or when he reasonably believes both
that:
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being
defeated by resistance or escape; and
(2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a
forcible felony or is attempting to escape by use of a
deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger
human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested with-
out delay.61
(a) A peace officer or other person who has an arrested person
in his custody is justified in the use of such force to prevent the
escape of the arrested person from custody as he would be justified
in using if he were arresting such person.
(b) A guard or other peace officer is justified in the use of
force, including force likely to cause death or great bodily harm,
which he reasonably believes to be necessary to prevent the escape
from a penal institution of a person whom the officer reasonably
believes to be lawfully detained in such institution under sentence
60. Id. at 131.
61. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1964). See generally Aspen, Arrest
and Arrest Alernatives: Recent Trends, 1966 U. ILL. L. FoRUM 241 (1966).
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for an offense or awaiting trial or commitment for an offense.62
"Forcible felony" means treason, murder, voluntary manslaugh-
ter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnaping, aggravated battery
and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical
force or violence against any individual.63
The use of deadly force is restricted, in general, to certain enumerated
felonies and any others involving physical violence, or to situations which
endanger human life or threaten great bodily harm.6 4 Prevention of an
escape from a penal institution (as distinguished from personal custody
after arrest) is the sole exception. The rationale for the less restrictive
rule in this situation is said to be based on (1) the need to deter other
prisoners, likewise confined, from making a similar attempt either im-
mediately or at a later time; (2) the belief that the guard in charge of
the prisoners cannot be expected to know the history of each prisoner,
62. ILt. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 7-9 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
63. Id. § 2-8.
64. New York's recently amended statute is very much in accord with Illinois:
1. A peace officer, in the course of effecting or attempting to effect an
arrest, or of preventing or attempting to prevent the escape from custody,
of a person whom he reasonably believes to have committed an offense, may
use physical force when and to extent he reasonably believes such to be
necessary to effect the arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody, or
to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to
be the use or imminent use of physical force; except that he may use
deadly physical force for such purposes only when he reasonably believes
that:
(a) The offense committed by such person was:
(i) a felony or an attempt to commit a felony involving the use or
attempted use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a person;
or
(ii) kidnapping, arson, escape in the first degree, burglary in the first
degree or any attempt to commit such a crime; or
(b) The offense committed or attempted by such person was a felony
and that, in the course of resisting arrest therefor or attempting to escape
from custody, such person is armed with a firearm or deadly weapon; or
(C) Regardless of the particular offense which is the subject of the arrest
or attempted escape, the use of deadly physical force is necessary to defend
the peace officer or another person from what the officer reasonably be-
lieves to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force.
2. The fact that a peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force
under circumstances prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision
one does not constitute justification for reckless conduct by such peace
officer amounting to an offense against or with respect to innocent persons
whom he is not seeking to arrest or retain in custody ...
N.Y. PE AL LAw § 35.30 (McKinney Supp. 1970). See generally Tsimbinos, The Justi-
fled Use of Deadly Force, 4 CRiM. L. But. 3 (1968).
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i.e., whether his offense was a forcible felony or whether he is likely to
endanger the lives of others; (3) the knowledge that the sudden and un-
expected nature of an escape leaves the guard no time to investigate into
the person's possession of a deadly weapon; and lastly, (4) the recogni-
tion that the'desperate nature of such an escapee is such that he can be
expected to use any instrumentality of deadly force he finds available.
In four states, then, the use of deadly force by the police is restricted
to forcible or violent felonies which include the use or the threatened
use of dangerous physical force. 68
The Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code, promulgated in 1962, provides:
Section 3.07. Use of Force in Law Enforcement.
(1) Use of Force Justifiable to Effect an Arrest. Subject to the
provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force
upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor
is making or assisting in making an arrest and the actor believes
that such force is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest.
(2) Limitations on the Use of Force.
(a) The use of force is not justifiable under this Section un-
less:
(i) the actor makes known the purpose of the arrest or be-
lieves that it is otherwise known by or cannot reasonably be
made known to the person to be arrested; and
(ii) when the arrest is made under a warrant, the warrant
is valid or believed by the actor to be valid.
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this
Section unless:
65. ILL. Aaql. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-9, Comment, at 287 (Smith-Hurd 1964). Compare the
New York provision:
A guard or peace officer who is charged with the duty of guarding
prisoners in a detention facility, ... or while in transit to or from a deten-
tion facility, may use physical force when and to the extent that he reason-
ably believes such to be necessary to prevent the escape of A prisoner from
a detention facility or from custody while in transit thereto or therefrom.
N.Y. PENAL LAw 35.30(5) (McKinney Supp. 1970). See also the Commentary to this
section of the statute indicating that this provision includes the use of deadly force.
Id. at Commentary, 49.
66. Note 56 supra.-
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(i) the arrest is for a felony; and
(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as
a peace officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be
authorized to act as a peace officer; and
(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no
substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and
(iv) the actor believes that:
(1) the crime for which the arrest is made involved con-
duct including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or
(2) there is a substantial risk that the person to be ar-
rested will cause death or serious bodily harm if his appre-
hension is delayed.
(3) Use of Force to Prevent Escape from Custody. The use of
force to prevent the escape of an arrested person from custody is
justifiable when the force could justifiably have been employed to
effect the arrest under which the person is in custody, except
that a guard or other person authorized to act as a peace officer
is justified in using any force, including deadly force, which he
believes to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a
person from a jail, prison, or other institution for the detention of
persons charged with or convicted of a crime.
(5) Use of Force to Prevent Suicide or the Commission of a
Crime.
(a) The use of force upon or toward the person of another
is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immedi-
ately necessary to prevent such other person from committing
suicide, inflicting serious bodily harm upon himself, committing
or consummating the commission of a crime involving or threat-
ening bodily harm, damage to or loss of property or a breach
of the peace, except that:
(i) any limitations imposed by the other provisions of this
Article on the justifiable use of force in self-protection, for
the protection of others, the protection of property, the
effectuation of an arrest or the prevention of an escape from
custody shall apply notwithstanding the criminality of the
conduct against which such force is used; and
(ii) the use of deadly force is not in any event justifiable
under this Subsection unless:
(1) the actor believes that there is a substantial risk that
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the person whom he seeks to prevent from committing a
crime will cause death or serious bodily harm to another
unless the commission or the consummation of the crime
is prevented and that the use of such force presents no sub-
stantial risk of injury to innocent persons; or
(2) the actor believes that the use of such force is neces-
sary to suppress a riot or mutiny after the rioters or muti-
neers have been ordered to disperse and warned, in any
particular manner that the law may require, that such force
will be used if they do not obey.
(b) The justification afforded by this Subsection extends to
the use of confinement as preventive force only if the actor takes
all reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as
he knows that he safely can, unless the person confined has been
arrested on a charge of crime. 67
Section 3.09. Mistake of Law as to Unlawfulness of Force or
Legality of Arrest; Reckless or Negligent Use of Otherwise
Justifiable Force; Reckless or Negligent Injury or Risk of In-
jury to Innocent Persons.
(1) The justification afforded by [Section] ... 3.07 . . . is
unavailable when:
(a) the actor's belief in the unlawfulness of the force or con-
duct against which he employs protective force or his belief in
the lawfulness of an arrest which he endeavors to effect by force
is erroneous; and
(b) his error is due to ignorance or mistake as to the pro-
visions of the Code, any other provision of the criminal law or
the law governing the legality of an arrest or search.
(2) When the actor believes that the use of force upon or to-
ward the person of another is necessary for any of the purposes for
which such belief would establish a justification under [Section
3.07] . . . but the actor is reckless or negligent in having such be-
lief or in acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief
which is material to the justifiability of his use of force, the justi-
fication afforded by those Sections is unavailable in a prosecution
for an offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case
may be, suffices to establish culpability.
(3) When the actor is justified under [Section 3.07] . . . in
using force upon or toward the person of another but he reck-
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (1962).
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lessly or negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to innocent
persons, the justification afforded by those Sections is unavailable
in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence towards inno-
cent persons.68
Even the most cursory examination of the Code reveals its departure
from the common law, as well as its influence upon the Illinois and New
York statutes.69 Although the Model Penal Code is much more com-
prehensive than either of these statutes, the basic thrust is the same.
The hallmark of the Code, and similarly of the "dangerous felony"
statutes, is the sanction of the use of deadly force by the police only
when the felon's conduct includes the use or threatened use of deadly
force, or when there is a substantial risk that the felon will cause death or
serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed.70 The Code expressly
recognizes the need to temper the use of deadly force with the potential
risk of injury to innocent third persons. 1' In brief, the Model Penal
Code is bottomed on the principle that ". . the use of deadly force
should only be justifiable in those situations where the irmnediate appre-
hension of the person to be arrested overrides all competing considera-
tions." 72
CONCLUSION
At common law all felonies were punishable by death, thereby estab-
lishing the basis for the rule that deadly force was justified when neces-
68. Id. S 3.09. See also the Model Penal Code's definition of deadly force, note 2
supra.
69. The Illinois and New York statutes are reproduced in the text accompanying
notes 61-63, 64-65 supra.
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.07(2) (b) (iii), (5) (a) (ii) (1) (1962) 'with N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 35.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1970) (innocent third parties); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.09 (1962) qith N.Y. PENAL LAw 5 35.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1970) (reckless
conduct of the police officer); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (3) (1962) 'with ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 7-9 (Smith-Hurd 1964) and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(5) (McKinney Supp. 1970)
(escape from custody-detention); MODEL PENAL LAw § 3.07(2) (b) (iv) (1962) with
hi. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1964) and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(1)
(a) (i), (1) (c) (McKinney Supp. 1970) (forcible felony concept or dangerousness if
apprehension is delayed).
70. MoDEL PENAL CODE 3.07(2) (b) (iv), (5) (a) (ii) (1) (1962). Compare GA. CODE
AN. § 26-902(a) (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1964); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2) (1950); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.30(1) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (2) (b) (iii) (1962). Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW §
35.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
72. MPG Tent. Draft, Comment 3, at 58-59.
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sary to combat a felon, but not a misdemeanant. As the law evolved,
many new felonies were created by statute, while the use of the death
penalty became restricted to but a very few crimes. Although the basis
for the. common law rule had disappeared, the rule itself remained. As
a result, today it is possible, under the majority of state statutes, for a
suspected criminal to be justifiably killed by a police officer in the course
of an arrest or of preventing an escape for any felony regardless of the
dangerousness of the crime involved. A few states have taken cogniz-
ance of this anachronism in the law and departed from the common
law rule in an attempt to balance the interests of society against the com-
peting interest of the criminal's life. In formulating a new rule, these
states have specified that the criminal's life may not justifiably be taken
unless such a person commits a forcible or dangerous felony, or threatens
the life or person of another. This new approach appears far more valid
than the perpetuation of the outmoded, and arguably immoral, common
law rule.
NICHOLAS JoHN DERomA
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